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Supply chains enable us as consumers to get the goods we desire. A basic supply chain
goes from raw materials to the end consumer (and sometimes back up the supply chain in a
reverse

flow).

Encompassing

procurement,

raw

materials,

production,

warehousing,

distribution/transportation, retail outlets, and consumption, supply chains can be almost infinitely
complex. Figure 1 is an example of a basic supply chain, where the arrows represent the flow of
goods via transportation, and each box represents a process in the supply chain. Almost every
product goes through some sort of supply chain. Supply chains can travel across state, country,
and continental boundaries. Many supply chains for consumer goods span the world, with
products designed in the United States, raw materials sourced from any number of continents,
shipped to and produced in Asia, and then shipped from Asia to the n1arkets they will be sold in,
which could be anywhere in the world. Globally, consumers are becoming aware of the impacts
of their purchases on the environn1ent; there is a movement toward ethically sourced products,
which considers the environment as well as other ethical matters when determining a source for
raw materials. Consumer awareness and opinion influences any manufacturer hoping to sell a
product, and consumers are just beginning to care and seek knowledge about where their food
comes from.

Figure 1

Raw rv1atenals
End Consumer

Food supply chains look much like any other supply chain. Figure 2 shows a typical food
supply chain, with the boxes representing the life of an animal destined for the table. Since this
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paper concerns animals in the food supply chain, I will describe what an animal supply chain can
look like. Animals are either raised by the company that will sell them, as in the case of poultry,
or are raised on factory farms, then sold for fattening. Once an animal being raised for slaughter
has reached slaughter weight, it is then sent to the slaughterhouse where it is killed, and then
taken to a processor who will process wholesale cuts of meat. The wholesaler will then process
retail and food service cuts of meat which are sold to restaurants and retail outlets, such as
grocery stores. They are then ordered by consumers at restaurants, or bought by moms at the
grocery store to be cooked for dinner and eaten by families across America.
Figure 2

80m on a farm

Wholesale
Processing

1--_......

Retail Processing
End Consumer

Sia ughterhouse

These animals don't move from one step in the supply chain to another automatically.
Transfer from process to process is undertaken by our network of tractor-trailers on interstate
systems. Cows are typically not raised near their feedlots, and feedlots may not be near
slaughterhouses. At every juncture in the supply chain there is a trailer waiting to move cattle (or
any other animals raised for slaughter) to their next destination.

4

Not enough is being done to minimize suffering for animals farmed for food. This paper
seeks to address the suffering of animals and set out new guidelines needed for the meat industry.
Having described the food supply chain, this paper will then give a brief synopsis of the current
theories of animal ethics, and proceed with Singer's preference utilitarian ethic while evaluating
current standards for meat production.
There is a lot to be said about factory farmed animals today. Approxin1ately 190 pounds
of meat per person are consumed each year (Nolt 174). Singer estimates that 100 million cows,
pigs, and sheep are raised and slaughtered in the United States are consumed each year, and 5
billion chickens are raised and slaughtered each year (95). Beef cattle are not allowed to move
around, because to move around would waste calories, and the goal is to fatten quickly for
slaughter. They are raised on a diet of grain and antibiotics, though their natural diet is grass and
roughage, and the grain disrupts their stomach. The antibiotics are meant to take care of
infections, though the infections are from living in cramped, unnatural conditions, and not all the
cows are in need of medicine. These antibiotics are passed on to consumers in the meat we buy
and eat. Once cattle reach slaughter weight, they are sent to slaughterhouses, having to ride in a
trailer for hundreds of miles, without time to stretch, sometimes without food or water (Singer
137,139-41).
Hogs aren't treated much differently, though they will spend their entire lives indoors.
Sows are forced to live in a pen known as the "iron maiden" which does not allow them to move
around at all, and their piglets are taken from them at only 3 to 4 weeks (Nolt 196). Those sows
not being fattened for market are fed less than 60% of what they would normally eat. Pigs have
intelligence comparable to that of a dog, they get bored easily and are prone to biting each
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other's tails when confined without entertainment, so hog producers "dock" the pigs' tails
(Singer 121-29).
Though all farm animals are treated poorly, chickens may get the shortest end of the stick.
Chickens are typically placed in battery cages, wire mesh cages with less than half a square foot
of space per chicken. Typically five or more chickens are placed in one wire cage for the entire
seven weeks of their life. They are bred to grow twice as fast and twice as large as traditional
chickens, which puts a strain on their hearts and lungs, which do not grow at the same pace (Nolt
199). Their environment is controlled to cause more weight gain in less time and on less feed.
Food and water are dispensed automatically and lighting adjusted to nlake the chickens grow and
decrease aggression. The crowded conditions in which chickens are kept causes aggression
between the chickens, so their beaks are cut off in a process called "debeaking." Flocks of up to
90 chickens can live peacefully, because they establish a pecking order, but when 10,000 to
50,000 birds are in one shed, there is no way to establish pecking order, and the stress and
fighting will occur. Laying chickens have a strong desire to nest, and not giving them this
opportunity creates stress. The high levels of ammonia in the air hurt their lungs (Singer 98-120).
It is apparent that these animals suffer throughout their lives before being killed. They are

raised for the purpose of feeding those of us who enjoy the taste of meat on our dinner plates,
without concern for how the meat came to be on our plates. The next section will explore three
ethical theories for treatment of animals, determine which of these we should use, and set out
guidelines for what should change in the food supply chain.
Peter Singer's Animal Liberation (1975) advocates equal consideration of animals and
people. Singer establishes the principle of equalit,y which requires equal consideration for equal
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interests. "The basic element

the taking into account of the interests of the being, whatever

those interests may be - must, according to the principle of equality, be extended to all beings,
black or white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman" (Singer 5). The principle of
equality does not state that all people and animals are equal as individuals, but that we should
consider their interests equally. It implies that our concern for others should not depend on what
they are like, or what abilities they have (Singer 5). All sentient individuals, both people and
animals, have an interest in not suffering. Singer believes that intelligence does not matter; pain
is the same in both humans and animals. While humans have ways of suffering animals do not,
animals have ways of suffering humans are not capable of. Singer calls our prejudice against
animals speciesism. He compares speciesism to racism and sexism, saying that discrimination
based on arbitrary characteristics has no basis (Singer 6). Singer's principle of equality says we
must consider the suffering of every being as having the same weight as suffering affecting any
other being. Any individual's suffering should be considered equal to any other individual's
suffering, whether those sentient individuals are human or non-human animals. He goes
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to

say that many animals are caused unnecessary suffering through animal research and animal
agriculture, solely for human benefit; actions that cause suffering to animals for benefits to
humans that could be achieved without suffering are wrong. Singer advocates preference
utilitarianism, saying that we ought to choose the action that will provide the least amount of
preference frustration, or suffering, for all individuals involved. He focuses on minimizing
suffering, rather than maximizing pleasure; the same focus of most ethicists, as minimizing
suffering is the more urgent task.
Singer makes

110

argument that animals are capable of acting morally, only that the moral

principle of equal consideration for equal interests applies to animals. He argues that we give
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equal consideration for equal interests to young children and other humans who do not have the
mental capacity for n10ral choice (Singer 225).
Singer's only argument against killing animals for food, as opposed to causing them to
suffer, is that it makes us think of them as "objects we can use casually for our own nonessential
purposes" (Singer 229). This attitude can lead to disrespect and mistreatment of animals.
Essentially, Singer comes to the conclusion that we should not eat factory farmed meat because
the animals are caused suffering, but preference utilitarian arguments do not support arguments
against eating meat when it can be produced without suffering. They do, however, support strong
arguments against eating meat, as meat production causes suffering. Preference utilitarianism
says that if we are going to eat meat, we ought to minimize the suffering involved in its
production. Singer does make a deontological argument for not eating meat, saying that if we eat
meat only to satisfy our taste buds, then the being we are eating is no more than a means to an
end (Singer 160).
Written after Peter Singer's Animal Liberation in 1983, Tom Regan's book The Case for

Animal Rights outlines why animals have rights and what those rights are. Animals have rights
because they have welfare - the ability to fare well or ill. According to Regan, there are basic
requirements that must be met for an individual who has the ability to live well to be able to do
so. These requiren1ents include animals' opportunities to exercise autonomy, take satisfaction in
pursuing and getting what they prefer so long as what they pursue is in their interests, or satisfy
desires without being interfered with.
Regan argues against Singer's direct duty view, meaning that we have duties owed to
animals, on his path to prove his rights theory. He disputes preference utilitarianism, which he
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sums up to say that we should aim to produce consequences that further the interests (preference
satisfaction) of individuals and do not prevent individuals from furthering their interests
(preference frustration). It should be noted that Singer's view of preference utilitarianism does
not require maximizing pleasure, but only minimizing suffering. Regan doesn't like this view
because it implies animals and anyone affected by consequences of an action is a mere receptacle
of value. The tern1 receptacle of value, coined by Regan, means that an individual does not have
any value of its own, until we decide to attribute value to it through our actions (such as
minimizing suffering), Regan states that when we treat individuals as mere receptacles, we are
treating them as if they have no inherent value in and of themselves (Regan 205).
Regan also criticizes Singer's principle of preference utility (aggregate amount of
preference satisfaction minus preference frustration), saying it depends on the principle of
equality (equal consideration of interests), but moral principles must be derivable from the
principle of utility, so the principle of equality is derivable from the principle of utility (Regan
206-08). Simply put, Regan is arguing that Singer's principle of equality cannot be used as a
moral principle because it is not derived from the principle of utility. This is a flawed argument
against Singer, however, because there is no moral or philosophical reason why Singer cannot
advocate both the principle of equality and the principle of utility.
Regan's own theory is that individual moral agents have a distinctive kind of value. The
inherent value of moral agents (those with the ability to make moral decisions) cannot be earned
or lost, and does not increase or decrease depending on degree of utility~ it is also independent of
whether they are the object of anyone else's interests, because they have inherent value and are
not mere receptacles of value (Regan 236). So, if a moral agent has inherent value, harm done to
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the moral agent cannot be justified by producing the best consequences based on the outcome
(because it has value in and of itself and therefore has rights that cannot be overridden except by
greater rights). This makes this view in opposition to preference utilitarianism, which uses moral
agents as mere receptacles of consequences.
In determining what is conlmon across all individuals with inherent value, Regan says
they are all subjects-of-a-life. Humans who are moral patients (unable to make a moral decision)
are given the same rights as humans who are moral agents, because they are subjects-of-a-life;
Regan sees no reason not to extend the same rights to animals who are moral patients. Subjectsof-a-life must have beliefs and desires, a sense of self and the future, emotional life with feelings
of pleasure and pain, preference and welfare-interests, the ability to initiate action in pursuit of
goals, and an individual welfare. Animals have all these preferences and abilities, and are
therefore considered subjects-of-a-life (Regan 243-44).
Regan asserts a respect principle which states that we should treat individuals with
inherent value (so, all subjects-of-a-life) in ways that respect that inherent value. In acting in
such a way as to bring about the best aggregate consequences (preference utilitarianism), even
though it causes harm to an individual with inherent value, we are not displaying respect,
because we are treating that individual as a mere receptacle of value if we are concerned only
with the consequences and not with the individual himself. We also have the prima facie duty to
assist those with inherent value who are being treated unjustly. The respect principle does not,
however, charge us with the duty to count equal preferences and pleasures equally, but to give
each and every moral agent the same respectful treatment due to any other moral agent (Regan
248-49).
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Regan's argument is based on the statement that moral rights are universal, equal, and do
not arise as a result of the creative acts of anyone individual or group (Regan 267-68). One's
having a right puts that individual in a position to claim something is owed to them. As moral
agents we all have unacquired duties, which, according to Rawls, "Apply to us without regard to
our voluntary acts," and hold, "irrespective of institutional arrangements." We have a duty of
justice, and therefore the right to just treatment is a basic right (Regan 273). The claim to
respectful treatment is no stronger or weaker in the case of patients than it is for moral agents
(Regan 276). All moral agents have the power to treat moral patients with the respect they are
due, and there is no reason why moral rights of moral patients should be any different than moral
rights of moral agents, but only moral agents can have duties. One who would harm another or
allow harm to occur must be able to do so by appealing to other moral principles and show these
principles morally outweigh the right not to be harmed (Regan 279-80).
According to Regan, animals are not n10ral agents because they do not have the ability to
do what is right or what is wrong; therefore they cannot do anything that merits treatment that is
prima facie a violation of their rights. Regan believes animal agriculture is unjust because it fails
to treat farm animals with the respect they are due; instead treating them as renewable resources
with value only relative to human interests.
Singer and Regan both agree that factory farming causes harms to animals and is not
ethically defensible. Regan, however, makes an argument within his ethic about the morality of
killing an animal, and gives all individuals inherent moral worth, meaning it is not acceptable to
cause them harm or take their life, even if the consequences are small.
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Most recently, David DeGrazia wrote Taking Animals Seriously (1996) to find an ethic
that did not have the shortcomings of Singer and Regan. DeGrazia felt that Singer failed to
address many important issues, such as the nature of suffering and how it relates to mental states,
difficulties with utilitarianism, and a shaky defense of equal consideration for animals being
compatible with the belief that the lives of normal humans are ordinarily more valuable than the
li ves of animals (DeGrazia 3).
DeGrazia criticizes Singer for not discussing the nature of suffering and how suffering is
related to mental states. DeGrazia thinks that the amount of suffering an individual can feel
depends on the individual's mental capacity. Singer does not believe that suffering is dependent
on the intelligence of an individuat all sentient individuals have the capacity to suffer.
DeGrazia's next criticism of Singer's argument is against utilitarianism. DeGrazia says
Singer's utilitarianism "implies that not only animals - but humans -lack moral rights, because

there is no such thing as a moral

right~

the only ultimate moral standard is the principle of

utility." Since the principle of utility calls for maximizing the greatest good, we could sometimes
be called upon to ignore an individual's interests for the greater good (DeGrazia 4). However,
Singer advocates a negative utilitarianism which does not call for maximizing the greatest good,
but rather minimizing the amount of harms done. This negative principle of utility would not call
for overriding an individual's interests in the name of the greater good. But Singer's view would
override an individual's interests in order to prevent greater suffering.
Finally, DeGrazia says Singer's defense of equal consideration being compatible with the
common belief that human life is more valuable than animal life is shaky. Many people believe
that hunlan life is more valuable than animal life, and Singer accepts this fact, given the principle
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of equality, DeGrazia thinks Singer should explain how he accepts it. Singer does say that human
preference is no greater than animal preference. Though DeGrazia gives us a laundry list of
complaints about Singer, Singer's view is still ethically acceptable. Singer does not set out to
solve all of the problems, only to minimize the suffering of animals.
DeGrazia tells us that equal consideration does not entail identical rights for humans and
animals, a moral requirement to treat humans and animals equally, or an absence of morally
interesting differences between animals and hun1ans (DeGrazia 37-38). Neither Singer nor Regan
disagree with this statement. Singer says equal consideration means equal consideration for equal
interests, which does not mean that we should treat humans and animals equally, but that we
should consider their interests equally. Regan does not suggest equal consideration, nor does he
suggest identical rights for humans and animals, but he does say we ought to respect the rights of
animals, which include an equal right to life, and an equal right to noninterference by moral
agents. The principle of equal consideration rules out routine overriding of animals' relevantly
similar interests in the name of human benefit. Equal treatn1ent is not required by either Singer or
Regan, because anin1als have different needs, just like they have different interests, so animals
do not need the same treatment as humans. Singer and Regan also both agree that there are
significant moral differences between humans and animals, but Regan puts value on life itself
and on respect for rights, while Singer places value on the avoidance of suffering.
Universalizability and formal justice imply that we should grant equal n10ral weight to
everyone's relevantly similar interests, unless there is a relevant difference between the beings in
question (DeGrazia 51).
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The principle of nonmaleficence, advocated by DeGrazia, states that we have a duty not
to harm others; we also have obligations not to cause unnecessary suffering (DeGrazia 259).
These obligations give us a list of ways we ought and ought not treat animals, with humans, great
apes, and dolphins garnering more consideration than other sentient beings; DeGrazia believes
those higher mammals have the capacity for moral agency (199). Using scientific research,
DeGrazia presents the evidence that many animals have feelings, desires, and beliefs. In order to
present an individual with moral agency, one must be capable of deliberating on the basis of
moral reasons, acting on the basis of deliberation, and justifying one's decision with an argument
appealing to moral reasons. Other animals besides humans, great apes, and dolphins do not have
the capacity for moral agency, because they cannot use language and have not shown the ability
to act morally, so the presumption of their rights is weaker than that for higher animals, but still
should be considered. DeGrazia makes a list of principles that define how we ought and ought
not treat animals that includes not causing unnecessary harm, and making efforts not to provide
financial support for those institutions (such as factory farms) that cause unnecessary harm, it
also includes not causing significant suffering for the sake of yours or others' enjoyment, not
killing or confining sentient animals unnecessarily, nor disabling sentient animals (DeGrazia
279). Conditions of any justified confinement must be responsive to the animal's needs. Factory
farms obviously violate these conditions - they cause significant suffering, kill sentient animals
unnecessarily, and needlessly disable sentient animals. None of the harnls inflicted on factory
farmed animals can be considered necessary. Humans do not need meat in their diet to survive,
so an omnivorous diet is unnecessary for humans. Family farms are more ethically defensible
than factory farms, but are still not completely ethically defensible. Some farming practices still
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cause unnecessary suffering of the farm animals, such as castration and branding, and the killing
of sentient animals is still regarded by DeGrazia as unnecessary (DeGrazia 279-88).
DeGrazia and Singer both agree that causing suffering to animals is bad, but DeGrazia
believes the moral badness comes in degrees, depending on the moral agency of the animal in
question. It is worse to cause a harm to a being with the capacity to act n10rally (human, great
ape, dolphin) than it is to cause the same harm to a being without capacity for moral agency (dog,
bird).
Regan says Singer's view treats animals as mere receptacles of value, and fails to give
them inherent value. DeGrazia says animals' desires and beliefs should be considered, and the
capacity for moral agency defines how much moral consideration ought to be given to
individuals. Regan and DeGrazia are concerned with the moral implications of ending an
animals' life, not solely with the suffering of the animal. Singer admits his ethic is incomplete,
but is solely concerned with the suffering of animals, not with the morality of ending their lives.
This paper will not use Singer's deontological argument for vegetarianism, instead I opt to only
use Singer's preference utilitarian argument for minimizing suffering. In response to Regan's
objection to Singer treating individuals as mere receptacles of value, Singer says that argument is
too controversial for him to discuss.
Singer's view, though deemed inadequate by DeGrazia and Regan, is the one this paper
will use to set out standards and guidelines for the ethical treatment of animals in the food supply
chain. The minimization of suffering is minimally required of us as human beings and moral
agents. Though it would be grand to imagine that everyone will immediately stop eating factory
farmed meat, I am too practical to imagine that. I will not use Regan's or DeGrazia's framework
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in this paper to defend what I am saying ought to happen. I will use the minimal ethic in hopes
that it is more well-received by those on whom it has an impact.
Now that we have acknowledged that there is an ethical problem with the way animals
are currently treated on factory farms, what should we do about the problem? Many countries in
the European Union have established stringent laws for the treatment of farm animals, and a few
states (Arizona, Florida, California, Colorado, Michigan, and Oregon) here in the United States
have recently passed legislation protecting farm animals. Most of this legislation requires that
farm animals being raised for food are not confined to the degree that they cannot turn in a circle
and lie down comfortably. Battery cages for chickens are also being phased out. This is a good
start, but it is not enough. Nebraska is the only state to have voted down legislation protecting
the welfare of farm animals. Many organizations have set out guidelines for humane treatment of
animals. I will take my lead from them.
There are many animals that I could discuss guidelines for, but in this paper I will look at
beef cattle, laying hens, and pigs. The industry standard does not set forth even a minimum
consideration for the welfare of animals, so it is insufficient. Instead, we will look at independent
standards set out by various programs to determine a set of guidelines to make current farming
practices more morally acceptable. The Certified Humane Program (HFAC), American Humane
Certified (AHA), Animal Welfare Approved (AW A), and Global Animal Partnership

ar~

all

certifications that can be applied to meat that meets the standards of these sponsoring
organizations. The Global Animal Partnership has a five-step program that allows producers to
become certified one step at a time, with each following step providing more stringent guidelines
for animal treatment. Though each of the organizations mentioned is looking out for the best
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interests of animals, they do not agree on every item of concern. For instance, when considering
beef cattle's access to pasture, the Certified Humane Program and American Humane
Certification do not require pasture access and allow animals to be kept in feedlots, while the
Global Animal Partnership's Step 5 Plus requires that cattle must live continuously on range or
pasture. All the certifications prohibit the spaying of heifers, and while the Animal Welfare
Approval certification prohibits electric prod use, the other certifications allow it in emergency
instances. In my opinion, the best solution is to continually work toward a natural life that allows
for the instinctual behavior without human interference or inflicted suffering for the animals.
Working towards natural life for animals will minimize suffering caused by humans to the point
that one day all suffering for animals caused by humans might be eliminated. This cannot be
achieved all at once, but by taking it a step at a time, producers can improve animals' lives in a
cost-effective and humane manner.
All the animal welfare guidelines addressed in this paper have their basis in the Five
Freedoms, defined by the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FA WC). The concept of the Five
Freedoms originated from the Report of the Technical Committee to Enquire into the Welfare of
Animals kept under Intensive Livestock Husbandry Systems, the Brarnbell Report, December
1965. This original report stated that animals should have freedom "to stand up, lie down, turn
around, groom themselves, and stretch their limbs." These new five freedoms provide the basis
for the Five Freedoms of the FAWC today. These five freedoms "define ideal states rather than
standards for acceptable welfare" forming a framework for analysis of the welfare of animals.
The five freedoms are:
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1. Freedom from hunger and thirst

by ready access to fresh water and a diet to

maintain full health and vigor.
2. Freedom from discomfort - by providing an appropriate environment including
shelter and a comfortable resting area.
3. Freedom from pain, injury, or disease - by prevention or rapid diagnosis and
treatment.
4. Freedom to express normal behavior - by providing sufficient space, proper
facilities, and company of the animal's own kind.
5. Freedom from fear and distress - by ensuring conditions and treatments that avoid
mental suffering. (FAWC)
These five freedoms have their origins in both science and ethics; we will explore how
these ideals, with scientific support, fit our ethical model of preference utilitarianism, and
evaluate the guidelines for animal welfare standards according to our ethical theory. All five
freedoms can be justified by utilitarianism, since mental suffering is a form of preference
frustration. Animals do have interests in being satiating hunger and thirst; avoiding discomfort,
pain, injury, and disease; and to act on instinctual behaviors. These five freedoms work to
minimize preference frustration, but do they do enough?
As the preference utilitarian perspective on farm animals is the minimalist ethic, we need
only to find the bare minimum for the animals, which involves ensuring the minimization
preference frustration (suffering) of animals and also taking into account worker safety.
Utilitarianism, even when concerned with animals, must take all individuals who will be affected
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by actions into account. We can use the five freedoms as a good foundation for understanding
the preferences of farm animals.
Egg-Laying Hens

First, we will evaluate egg-laying hens. Chickens have instincts to "walk around, scratch
the ground, bathe in dust, build nests, or stretch their wings. Those raised on factory farms are
not part of a flock. They cannot keep out of each other's way, and weaker birds have no escape
from the attacks of stronger ones" (Singer 113). Hens instinctually want to build a nest and lay
their eggs. They will postpone laying their eggs in front of their cagemates for as long as is
possible (114). Dustbathing helps chickens maintain feather quality. This is done by forming a
hollow in fine soil, fluffing soil into the feathers, and then shaking to remove the dust (116).
Chickens have a natural "pecking order" which is a hierarchy that allows them to determine who
gets to feed first, and who has priority within the group. There are sometimes conflicts within the
group before pecking order is established, but once it is established, there are no conflicts.
However, within a group of more than 90 hens, there is no way to maintain a stable pecking
order and the extreme crowding causes chickens to resort to such vices as feather-pecking and
cannibalism (Singer 99,100). The animal welfare standard guidelines (see Appendix A) for
chickens includes antibiotics, ammonia levels, access to outdoors, minimum space per hen,
continuous confinement to wire cages, litter for dustbathlnest boxes, indoor lighting, and forced
molting.
Some animal welfare certifications (and all organic food certifications) prohibit the use of
antibiotics for animals. Other certifications call for it only in the treatnlent of illness. The third
of the five freedoms calls for the treatment of disease, which can sometimes be accomplished
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through treatment with antibiotics. We must consider the impacts of antibiotics in creating
disease-resistant strains of bacteria in determining whether or not to give animals antibiotics. It is
almost certain that giving animals antibiotics as a matter of precaution is to be frowned upon, but
in the long run, is it better for all individuals (human and non-human animals) to treat sick
animals with antibiotics, or not? As long as the antibiotics are not overused, it is in the animals'
best interests to be treated for disease. We must minimize suffering, and allowing an animal to
suffer from a disease we have the capability to treat is inherently wrong. Better antibiotic
practices by humans (not over prescribing them, taking the entire prescription, not sharing
antibiotics) and by those who are treating animals would help eliminate the issue of antibioticresistant strains of bacteria.
In the case of pigs and egg-laying hens, ammonia levels must be considered. High levels
of ammonia can lead to breathing problems and mucus membrane irritation in both workers and
the animals. It can also cause blurred vision and nausea, among other side effects in the farm
workers. The OSHA guideline for ammonia exposure for workers is less than 50 PPM over an
eight hour period. For these reasons, ammonia levels should be kept to less than 50 PPM over the
work day with shelters designed for ventilation and air circulation, which is a combination of the
recommended standards, for the health and safety of workers.
Access to the outdoors is not strictly necessary for hens, but continuous confinement to
wire cages should be prohibited, when chickens must be housed in cages, those cages must
provide adequate room for socializing, exercising, stretching, and moving about; the second
freedom from discomfort encourages this. These should give at least 1.25 square feet per hen
(enough room to stretch wings) or 1.0 to 1.2 square feet per hen if there is an overhead perch
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available. Wire cages ought not be used, as chicken's feet have been known to grow around the
wire, and the constant motion of rubbing against the wire has been known to remove the feathers.
Hens should be given at least eight hours per day of dim light, and six to eight hours per day of
complete darkness. Forced molting by withholding of food should be strictly prohibited, as it
causes great stress on the chickens.
The fourth freedom, freedom to express normal behavior, requires that chickens have
litter for dustbathing, the act of getting the dust in between their feathers helps them stay clean
and keep their feathers separated. Chickens confined to wire cages will dustbathe on the wire
floor, removing the feathers on their stomachs and causing skin problems there as well (116).
Chickens should be given the opportunity to nest, another instinctual activity that can cause
frustration in the animals if they aren't given the chance. A community nesting area with dividers
is sufficient, or one nesting box for no more than five hens. Depriving animals of the
environment needed to perform instinctual activities causes suffering, both mental and physical.
To the guidelines provided by the current certifying organizations, I believe we should
add battery cages, debeaking, the size of flocks, and the discarding of male chicks. Debeaking is
the process of removing the beak of the chicken, typically with a hot iron or guillotine-type tooL
This is considered necessary, because chickens that exhibit stress will engage in feather-pecking
and cannibalism (Singer 101,107). The removal of the beak typically causes great pain in the
animal and can sometimes prevent the animal from eating for several days. Many of these
problems induced by stress (feather-pecking, cannibalism, reluctance to lay, aggression) could be
eliminated if flock sizes were kept to less than 90 hens, so that a pecking order could be
established.
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Profit must be considered, of course, and if chickens are kept in smaller groups, then the
price to raise the chickens will increase substantially, and therefore the cost to consumers will
also face a substantial increase. The question is whether the financial implications should
outweigh the suffering of the animals, when the suffering could easily be greatly reduced or
eliminated. I could consider the ability of all families to afford chicken once prices are raised,
since it is one of the more affordable meats, but since we don't need meat to survive, I see no
need to do so. Protein can easily be found in beans, nuts, and whole grains. If the chickens are
kept in smaller groups, it could potentially require more workers to care for them, increasing job
opportunities, so my recommendation is that we allow chickens to be kept in groups small
enough to create pecking orders, which eliminates the need for debeaking, and if the other
recommendations are followed, eliminates nearly all suffering.
Finally, many male chicks are discarded when they are born by being tossed in a garbage
bag, ground up alive, or gassed, because they cannot lay eggs and are therefore considered
worthless. Male chicks have no economic value in egg operations, so I propose that if homes
cannot be found for them they be killed in a humane manner, not simply dumped in a trash can to
suffocate under others of their kind.
Pigs

"Of all the animals commonly eaten in the Western world, the pig is without a doubt the
most intelligent" (Singer 119). Pigs are also the n10st sensitive animals typically raised for
human food. As with chickens, there are several instinctual activities pigs in a normal habitat
participate in. Pigs form social groups, build communal nests, use areas away from their
communal nests to relieve themselves, and they spend most of their days rooting. Sows who are
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ready to give birth build their own nest, and stay there for approximately nine days after giving
birth before returning with the piglets to the communal nest. When living in crowded conditions,
pigs exhibit vices and stress in a similar way to chickens. Rather than feather-pecking, pigs resort
to tail biting. We have evaluated standards for antibiotics and ammonia levels; we will now
evaluate standards (Appendix B) for access to outdoors, tethers/gestation crates/farrowing crates,
minimum farrowing space per sow, bedding, slatted/wire floors, and indoor lighting.
Pigs should be granted access to the outdoors, but as with chickens, this is not strictly
necessary. This has benefit for the animals, and causes no harm for those humans involved in the
farming. The second freedom from discomfort prohibits gestation crates, tethers, and slatted,
wire, or concrete floors. Gestation crates are unacceptable; however, it is acceptable for sows to
be kept in farrowing crates (of at least 48 square feet) if there is room to turn around and they are
not kept constantly confined. Tethers are unacceptable, as they inhibit the hog's ability to move
around, and pigs kept tethered have been known to bite at the tether for lack of anything else to
do. Slatted, wire, and concrete floors cause serious damage to the feet and legs of pigs and
should not be used; rather, a straw bed is preferable for pigs to make their nest. Clean and dry
bedding is required, indoors and out, year-round. Artificial light is allowed, no nlore than 16
hours per day, daylight is preferable.
In addition to the considerations above, we should think about feed restriction for
breeding animals, minimunl weaning age, and tail docking. The first freedom, and the most basic,
is freedom from hunger and thirst. Many breeding animals are kept hungry, given only the
rations

needed

to

survive,

since

they

aren't

being

fattened

for

slaughter;

food

restriction/intentional starvation should not be allowed, pigs must have access to food each day,
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except when the veterinarian says otherwise (for the pig's own health). Ideally, pigs should have
access to forage between meals. The minimum weaning age for piglets is no less than eight
weeks, but should be closer to 12 weeks, as the natural weaning age of piglets is 3 months. Stress
is caused both to the piglets and the sow when the piglets are weaned too early. Routine tail
docking is prohibited except when health and welfare reasons allow for it. If pigs are not
aggressive, then there is no reason to dock their tails, and without creating stressful situations
through overcrowding and confinement, then they won't be aggressive. Allowing pigs the
opportunities to form social groups, as they instinctually do when left to their own natural desires
is essential in raising them, as it eliminates nearly all of the suffering caused by factory farming.

Beef Cattle
While beef cattle cannot be considered the most intelligent species of non-human animals,
they still have the ability to suffer. And while they do not display as many distinct instinctual and
social behaviors as egg-laying hens and pigs, they still have basic needs that must be attended to.
Here, we will be evaluating antibiotics, growth hormones, access to pasture, identification,
castration, debudding/dehorning, spaying of heifers, minimum weaning age, and electric prod
use (from Appendix C).
In the case of beef cattle, growth hormones can cause harm and suffering to the animals,
and those hormones can also be passed along in the meat to consumers (Nolt 175-76). Without
growth hormones, the cattle will grow more slowly, which could potentially have a marginal
profit impact, but the potential effects on human consumers and on the animals themselves
outweighs the profit loss. While many of the certifying organizations for ethically produced meat
allow for feedlots, the crowded conditions of feedlots lead to disease, discomfort, and digestive
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ailments for the animals. However, there is not enough pasture in the United States to allow all
the beef cows to be pasture-raised, so we must allow feedlots, but place some expectations on
their conditions. Hot iron branding and ear cutting are not acceptable methods of identification,
but ear tagging is acceptable. Castration at the earliest age possible is allowable, anesthesia
should always be used to prevent the suffering of the animaL Debudding and dehorning is
painful for animals, but essential for both worker and animal safety, so it should be done within
the first four months, using a hot iron, for efficiency and anesthesia to prevent pain. Electric prod
use also causes harm to animals, but is essential for worker safety, so it is allowable in
emergency situations. Spaying is unnecessary suffering, and therefore prohibited. Cows should
be weaned no earlier than six to nine months.
To add to the guidelines above, I add exposure to the elements and diet. Beef cattle are
typically raised exclusively on feedlots, which are not only uncomfortable on their feet, but also
offer no shelter from the elements. Indoor confinement rearing is not the answer, but offering
shade from the heat, and protection from snow and cold is essential, as in the second freedom,
freedom from discomfort. Most beef cattle are hardy animals, able to withstand the cold as long
as they are kept dry and have dry bedding. This can be accomplished by having solid fences,
barns, or sheds. The body heat from the cattle will help keep them all warnl. Cattle are typically
fed high-energy concentrates that are difficult for the cow's digestive system to process. Bovine
digestive systems are designed to process slowly fermenting grass (Singer 140). However, there
isn't enough grass to feed all the cows in all the farming operations, so a cornbination of typical
feed and grass and roughage should be fed to the cows to ensure their fiber intake is met and to
aid in the digestive process.
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In this paper, I have sought to describe the current situation on factory farms and suggest
solutions for nlinimizing the harms and suffering caused to factory farmed animals. I have set out
suggested new guidelines for the production of egg-laying hens, pigs, and beef cattle. While
these guidelines will not completely eliminate the suffering of animals, they are steps in the right
direction. Once these guidelines have been implemented and consumers have been made aware
of the plight of animals, we can hope that factory farming and animal circumstances will
continue to improve. Maybe in the future, there will be no need for factory farmed animals.
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Appendix I: Comparison of Animal Welfare Standards by Program EGG-LAVING H:ENS
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Appendix A
From Farm Sanctuary's "The Facts About Farm Industry Welfare Standards"
Accessed September 10,2009, from farmsanctuary.org, an organization working to end cruelty
to animals.
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Appendix G: COlnparison of Animal Welfare Standards by Program-
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Appendix B
From Farm Sanctuary's "The Facts About Farm Industry Welfare Standards"
Accessed September 10, 2009, from farmsanctuary.org, an organization working to end cruelty
to animals.
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Appendix 0: Comparison of .Animal Welfare Standards by Program -
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Appendix C
From Farm Sanctuary's "The Facts About Farm Industry Welfare Standards"
Accessed September 10,2009, from farmsanctuary.org, an organization working to end cruelty
to animals.
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